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“[P]robably the city’s most unfriendly and depressing piece of spiritual 
architecture” was how Washington Post columnist Marc Fisher described 
Washington, D.C.’s Third Church of Christ, Scientist in 2007.1  For decades, the 
small Christian Scientist congregation, situated two blocks from the White House, 
had struggled to fulfill its spiritual mission within the confines of its octagonal 
concrete structure.2  Built in 1971, the building was meant to be the permanent 
spiritual home of the small church, which had existed in downtown Washington, 
D.C. since 1918.3  Within ten years, the church was already looking for a new 
home.4  The building’s three windowless, sixty-foot high concrete walls proved a 
poor design choice for a religious assembly.5  The church found a number of 
architectural features objectionable:  the hidden front entrance to the building; the 
reinforced concrete wall framing the courtyard; the cavernous auditorium, over 
twice as large as desired; the poor natural light; the lack of a steeple; and the 
massive exterior concrete walls.6  According to the church, these austere features 
prevented the church from expressing its religious message and from ministering to 
the community.7  Demolition, however, was not possible:  in December 2007, the 
city designated the thirty-seven-year-old building as a historic landmark.8 
What felt like a concrete spiritual coffin to the church was viewed as an 
architectural masterpiece by others in the Washington, D.C. community.  The 
church enjoyed the distinction of having been built in the Brutalist architectural 
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 1. Marc Fisher, A Place Unfit for a Congregation, Much Less a Historic Designation, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 1, 2007, at B1. 
 2. Complaint ¶¶ 17, 23, Third Church of Christ, Scientist, Washington, D.C. v. D.C. Historic 
Preservation Review Bd., No. 1:08-cv-01371-JR (D.D.C. Aug. 7., 2008). 
 3. Id. ¶¶ 10, 16. 
 4. Id. ¶ 29. 
 5. See id. ¶¶ 17, 24. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. ¶¶ 21, 24. 
 8. Id. ¶¶ 1, 32. 
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style by a partner at I.M. Pei’s firm.9  Preservationists viewed the church as “one of 
the best examples of Brutalism in the Washington area and one of the most 
important Modernist churches.”10  According to the city’s Historical Preservation 
Review Board, Brutalism celebrates “the use of exposed, unadorned, cast concrete 
to construct buildings of ‘stark forms and raw surfaces.’”11  A local preservationist 
group first asked the Board to designate the church a landmark in 1991, but no final 
action was taken until 1997.12  In the sixteen-year interim, the church was a 
“proposed landmark” and was forced to maintain a structure it found inadequate for 
its religious needs.13  The eventual landmark designation prevented the church from 
razing, altering, or renovating the building without obtaining a special permit from 
the Review Board.14 
In 2008, Third Church filed suit against Washington, D.C. and its Historic 
Preservation Review Board, alleging a violation of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).15  Specifically, Third Church alleged that 
the city imposed a substantial burden on its religious exercise in the absence of any 
compelling governmental interest.16  In November 2010, after years of dispute, 
Third Church and the preservationists reached a settlement agreement allowing the 
church to demolish the structure.17  Because the district court stayed the federal 
lawsuit, the D.C. Circuit never had the opportunity to consider whether the city did 
in fact impose a substantial burden on Third Church’s religious exercise and violate 
RLUIPA.18 
 
 9. Designation, D.C. Historic Preservation Review Bd., No. 91-05, at 1–2 [hereinafter HPRB 
Designation]. 
 10. Id. at 1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 30–32. 
 13. Id. ¶¶ 44–46. 
 14. Id. ¶ 48. 
 15. See id. ¶¶ 73–74. 
 16. Id. ¶ 74. 
 17. See Settlement Agreement Executed by D.C. Pres. League, Third Church of Christ, Scientist 
and ICG 16th Street Assocs., LLC (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://temp-4.watersward.com/ 
Download-document/102-Settlement-Agreement-Executed-by-DC-Preservation-League-Third-Church-
and-ICG-Properties.html.  The dispute ultimately involved lawsuits in federal district court and in 
“state” court in the District of Columbia, as well as proceedings before multiple municipal entities.  Both 
Third Church and a local preservationist group maintain websites providing comprehensive accounts of 
the process; Third Church’s online archives of the historical and administrative record are particularly 
detailed.  See THIRD CHURCH FREEDOM, http://www.thirdchurchfreedom.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2013); 
The Third Church of Christ, Scientist, COMMITTEE OF 100 ON THE FED. CITY, http:// 
www.committeeof100.net/subcommittees/historic-preservation/the-third-church-of-christ-scientist/ (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
On October 25, 2012—over twenty years after preservationists filed a landmark application for the 
church—the D.C. Historic Preservation Review Board approved redevelopment plans for the Third 
Church site.  See Hearing, D.C. Historic Preservation Review Bd., HPA No. 12-344 (Oct. 25, 2012).  
Third Church estimates that construction will begin in January 2014 and conclude in spring 2016.  See 
Current Design Concept, THIRD CHURCH FREEDOM, http://www.thirdchurchfreedom.org/design.html 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
 18. See Memorandum Order, Third Church of Christ, Scientist, Washington, D.C. v. D.C. 
Historic Preservation Review Bd., No. 1:08-cv-01371-JR (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2010) (staying all proceedings 
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The D.C. Circuit, which, like the Supreme Court, has yet to determine the 
meaning of “substantial burden” as used in RLUIPA, would have been hard-
pressed to resolve the dispute.  Courts disagree pointedly over what “substantial 
burden” means for RLUIPA purposes.  Although circuit courts have offered an 
array of abstract formulations for interpreting RLUIPA’s substantial burden term, 
there is deep disagreement among them over which formulation is preferable. 
The Third Church dispute highlights significant tensions between architectural 
and historic preservation, on the one hand, and religious liberty, on the other.  
There is no reason to think these disputes will subside in the future.  But the courts 
have yet to develop a satisfying and workable approach to balancing the cities’ 
interest in historic preservation of architecturally important structures with the right 
of churches to define their own sacred space.  The courts of appeals have noted 
with frustration that RLUPA does not define “substantial burden,” and they have 
offered remarkably different vague formulations of the term.19  Although some 
commentators have taken note of these different definitions,20 they have done so in 
a largely descriptive fashion.21 
This Note argues that the circuits’ use of vague formulations in interpreting 
RLUIPA is overly restrictive and that an alternative multifactor approach—one that 
considers both the manner in which the state implements its law and the manner in 
which the church experiences the burden—would provide a more practical, 
workable paradigm for courts to employ in the future in resolving actual historic 
preservation and land use disputes.  That is, this Note suggests that it is the circuits’ 
very reliance on talismanic formulations that is problematic because RLUIPA’s 
substantial burden provision, particularly in the land use context, does not lend 
itself to the kind of bright-line definitions that the circuits have developed.  The 
solution is not to choose among the circuits’ formulations but to chart a new 
approach entirely.  To clear some underbrush, Part I introduces the structure and 
text of RLUIPA and outlines the colorful legislative history of the statute.  This 
 
in the district court case). 
 19. E.g., Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, Nos. 05-2309, 06-1210, 2007 
WL 4322157, *1, *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2007) (“Neither does the statute itself contain any definition of 
the term.”); San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“RLUIPA does not define ‘substantial burden.’”); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 
342 F.3d 752, 760 (7th. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he text of the statute contains no . . . express definition of the 
term ‘substantial burden’ . . . .”). 
 20. See, e.g., Sara C. Galvan, Beyond Worship:  The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions’ Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 207, 225–26 
(2006); Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone:  The Overbroad Applications and Troubling 
Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 822–828 (2006); Patricia 
E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism:  Evaluating the Creation of a 
Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 219–234 (2008). 
 21. This is not to say that all work in this area is such.  For what I consider to be the leading 
normative commentary in this area, see 1 KENT GREENAWALT, Difficult Determinations:  Burden and 
Government Interest and Land Development and Regulation, in RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:  
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 201, 233 (2006).  This work has had enormous impact on the 
development of ideas in this Note and, more generally, on the author’s interest in this topic. 
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Part sketches the roughly ten-year prelude to RLUIPA, which commenced with the 
Supreme Court’s landmark free exercise decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith and climaxed with a 
constitutional waltz between Congress and the Court.22  Part II provides an in-depth 
examination and critique of regnant approaches to interpreting RLUIPA’s 
substantial burden provision.  It argues that the various formulations relied on by 
the circuits, though derived through different means, are problematic in that they do 
not provide a workable framework for courts to use in deciding actual disputes.  
Part III first proposes an alternative multifactor framework that courts can employ 
to resolve real RLUIPA controversies.  It then illustrates the utility of this 
analytical approach by applying it to the case of the Third Church. 
I. 
Congress unanimously passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act in 2000.23  On its face, the statute restricts when government can 
impose a substantial burden on religious exercise in two specific contexts:  land use 
and prisons.24  Section 2 of the Act protects religious institutions from certain land 
use regulations, and section 3 protects the free exercise of prisoners and other 
institutionalized persons.25 
The land use section itself contains two major subparts:  a substantial burden 
provision, which mandates a strict scrutiny standard when government implements 
a land use regulation in a way that infringes a church’s free exercise, and an 
antidiscrimination provision that prohibits government from treating religious 
organizations “on less than equal terms” with nonreligious organizations.26  The 
substantial burden provision provides: 
(a) Substantial burdens.— 
(1) General rule.—No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in 
a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, 
 
 22. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5).  
 24. Id. § 2. 
 25. Id. § 3. 
 26. Id. § 2(a)–(b).  Although section 2(b) of RLUIPA, containing the antidiscrimination 
provisions, is not the focus of this Note, it has generated its own share of interpretative difficulties.  For 
instance, section 2(b)(1), the “equal terms” provision, forbids government from “impos[ing] a or 
implement[ing] a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less 
than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”  This section has produced a particularly 
pronounced intercircuit conflict.  Compare Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 
1228–35 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining to import a “similarly situated comparator” requirement into 
RLUIPA equal-terms analysis), with Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 
510 F.3d 253, 264–69 (3d Cir. 2007) (requiring a similarly situated comparator and requiring a religious 
assembly to show it was treated less well than a secular assembly “similarly situated as to the regulatory 
purpose.”).  For a particularly persuasive interpretation of the equal terms provision, see River of Life 
Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, Ill., 611 F.3d 367, 377–92 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting). 
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including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that 
imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution— 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.27 
Section 8 provides definitions for “government,” “land use regulation,” “religious 
exercise,” and even “demonstrates,” but the statute nowhere explains what 
constitutes a “substantial burden” or a “compelling governmental interest.”28  This 
has led the federal courts of appeals to interpret RLUIPA’s substantial burden 
provision in significantly different ways. 
Legislative history, however, offers some guidance on how to interpret the term.  
On July 27, 2000, Senator Hatch delivered remarks on the floor of the Senate in 
anticipation of RLUIPA’s passage.29  At the conclusion of his speech, Senator 
Hatch requested that a joint interpretive statement by himself and Senator Kennedy 
be inserted into the record.30  The joint statement amounts to a lengthy 
interpretative memorandum, containing a section titled “Definition of substantial 
burden.”31  It reads: 
The Act does not include a definition of the term “substantial burden” because it is not 
the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the definition of “substantial 
burden” on religious exercise.  Instead, that term as used in the Act should be 
interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Nothing in this Act, 
including the requirement in Section 5(g) that its terms be broadly construed, is 
intended to change that principle.  The term “substantial burden” as used in this Act is 
not intended to be given any broader interpretation than the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the concept of substantial burden on religious exercise.32 
The passage twice references Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence, and 
Senators Hatch and Kennedy made no secret of what they had in mind. 
RLUIPA represented the latest incarnation of Congress’ attempts to respond to 
the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Smith, what one leading religion and law 
scholar describes as “the controversial cornerstone of modern free exercise law.”33  
In Smith, the Court determined that Oregon could constitutionally deny members of 
the Native American Church unemployment compensation after they had been 
dismissed from jobs for religious drug use that was a central element of worship 
services.34  The message of Smith was that states were not obligated to grant 
 
 27. Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 2(a)(1). 
 28. See id. § 8 (providing various definitions and failing to define “substantial burden” and 
“compelling governmental interest”). 
 29. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at S7776 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). 
 32. Id. 
 33. GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 12. 
 34. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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religious exemptions to laws that were neutral and generally applicable.35 
Congress was not pleased.  In response to Smith, Congress in 1993 enacted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which required all levels of 
government to demonstrate a compelling interest before imposing a substantial 
burden on free exercise.36  Senator Hatch, a lead sponsor of RLUIPA, apparently 
viewed RFRA as the beginning of Congress’ post-Smith fight to protect religious 
liberty—a fight which culminated with the passage of RLUIPA.37 
Then, in 1997, the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores declared RFRA 
unconstitutional as applied to the states and local governments.38  Specifically, the 
Court found that Congress had exceeded its Enforcement Clause powers under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by passing a law that defined the scope of 
constitutional rights rather than one that was remedial and preventative in nature.39 
Congress again tried to respond to the Court, this time with the benevolently 
named Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA).40  The Act accomplished similar 
ends as RFRA, but Congress relied on its powers under the Spending and 
Commerce Clauses.  The bill overwhelmingly passed the House but lingered in the 
Senate due to concerns over the bill’s impact on civil rights, especially regarding 
housing and employment.41 
When RLUIPA was finally drafted, it represented a compromise in that it 
offered religious liberty protections in only two areas—but areas where Congress 
believed religion was frequently burdened:  land use regulation and 
institutionalized persons.42  These two areas were ones on which Congress had 
focused in nine different hearings over a three-year period.43  Congress, as with the 
RLPA bill, grounded its authority in the Spending and Commerce Clauses, as well 
as in the Enforcement Clause.44  The result was one of the most significant 
developments in American church-state law in the last quarter-century.  Although 
the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of the land use 
provisions, it upheld the prisoner provisions in 2006, which suggests the land use 
component will be treated as valid as well.45  The Supreme Court has also left it to 
the courts of appeals to grapple with determining the meaning of “substantial 
burden” as used in RLUIPA. 
Artistic preservation cases are particularly ripe for analysis because they have 
heretofore received scant analysis and because they highlight some of the central 
problems in interpreting RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision.  This context 
 
 35. See id. at 885–86; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 21, at 31. 
 36. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4). 
 37. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 38. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 39. Id. at 532–36. 
 40. H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 2148, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 41. See 146 CONG. REC. S7778 (statement of Sen. Reid). 
 42. Id. at S7774 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at S7775. 
 45. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
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provides an especially instructive RLUIPA case study because it requires courts to 
consider two extremely delicate questions:  on one hand, the religious significance 
of a church’s desire to have a particular façade and, on the other hand, the intrinsic 
value of and interest in architectural preservation. 
II. 
A.  “BY REFERENCE TO SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE” 
Because “substantial burden” is a term of art, one common interpretative 
approach is to turn to the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.  This 
approach, though offering the discrete benefit of fidelity to legislative intent, 
ultimately has limited usefulness because the Court’s prior attempts to formulate a 
definition of “substantial burden” were not developed with a land use context in 
mind.  As discussed in Part I, the drafters of the legislation indicated that the term 
“should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence” and “is not 
intended to be given any broader interpretation than the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the concept of substantial burden or religious exercise.”46  Several 
points are immediately worth noting.  First, the statement explicitly assumes that 
the Supreme Court has a body of jurisprudence explicating what “substantial 
burden” means, and it implicitly suggests that such jurisprudence is relevant to 
construing RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” term.  Second, the statement posits that 
the Court’s jurisprudence establishes the interpretative outer bounds of a 
“substantial burden,” implying that courts plausibly might interpret the term in a 
narrower way than the Court’s own reading. 
Consequently, several circuits have attempted to follow this approach by closely 
hewing their interpretation of RLUIPA to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.47  
The insurmountable problem with this approach, though, is that the Supreme Court 
has only articulated a very limited understanding of what counts as a “substantial 
burden”—and it has done so in contexts quite unlike the land use regulations at 
issue in RLUIPA.  The circuits almost invariably begin their analysis with homage 
to the Warren’s Court’s landmark decision in Sherbert v. Verner, in which South 
Carolina denied a Seventh-Day Adventist unemployment compensation after she 
was fired from her job for refusing to work on Saturday, her Sabbath day.48  
Sherbert produced the much-quoted dictate that a substantial burden exists when 
government places an individual in the cruel dilemma of “choos[ing] between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
 
 46. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). 
 47. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
defined the term in the related context of the Free Exercise Clause.”) (interpreting RLUIPA in the 
context of an institutionalized person case); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 
752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“RLUIPA’s legislative history indicates that it is to be interpreted by reference 
to . . . First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 48. 374 U.S. 398, 399–402 (1963). 
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abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other 
hand.”49  This is, on its face, a rather narrow test about public welfare legislation.  
Generally omitted from Sherbert’s famous quotation is the subject of the sentence:  
it is the state supreme court “ruling” that created the cruel dilemma;50 it is not at all 
clear that the Court intended this formulation as a test to be applied in other 
contexts or even other cases.  The context of the quote suggests the Court was 
simply characterizing the effect of the state supreme court decision.51 
In a series of unemployment compensation cases, the Court reaffirmed that a 
substantial burden on religion exists when a state conditions receipt of a 
government benefit on behavior prohibited by religious faith.52  Thomas involved a 
Jehovah’s Witness to whom Indiana denied unemployment compensation after he 
quit his job because he was asked to help manufacture weapons.53  Later, Hobbie 
again involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemployment benefits 
after she was fired from her job after refusing to work on her Sabbath.54  The 
unemployment compensation trilogy offers one articulation, albeit a nebulous one, 
of what amounts to an undue burden on religion:  “substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”55 
Aside from the three unemployment decisions,56 the Court has only once found 
government action so oppressive as to be a substantial burden on religion.57  In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the celebrated decision long considered to be the high 
watermark of the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence,58 the Justices determined that 
a state law requiring the Amish to send their children to school until age sixteen, 
under the threat of criminal punishment, presented an undue burden on the Amish’s 
religious practice.59  Despite its long, discursive opinion, the Court never offered a 
 
 49. Id. at 404. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added).  The full quote reads:  “The [South Carolina Supreme Court] ruling 
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.” 
 51. See id. at 403–04. 
 52. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981). 
 53. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710–12. 
 54. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138–39. 
 55. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. 
 56. The Court decided a fourth unemployment compensation case in 1989, but that case is largely 
indistinguishable from the prior three.  See Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) 
(finding a violation of the Free Exercise Clause when the state denied unemployment benefits to a 
Christian who refused to work on Sunday, even though he did not belong to a particular church or sect). 
 57. To be fair, the Court has not taken a substantial number of cases where this was at issue.  The 
Court did, though, reject a substantial burden claim in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 
where it found that the collection of a generally applicable tax did not impose a substantial burden.  493 
U.S. 378, 392 (1990).  In other religious freedom cases in the 1980s, the Court seemed to assume a 
substantial burden existed and decided the case based on whether a compelling government interest 
existed.  See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 58. E.g., Free Exercise Clause (I):  History, Background, Framing, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 625 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006) (“The ‘high water mark’ for free exercise 
clause protection . . . came in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) . . . .”). 
 59.  406 U.S. 205, 218, 235–36 (1972).  Parents who violated the state compulsory attendance 
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clear articulation of what it was about Wisconsin’s law that presented the 
substantial burden.60  It suggested, though, that a substantial burden on religion 
exists when government induces a person to violate religious precepts in order to 
avoid criminal sanctions.61 
In the context of land use and historic preservation, it is difficult to know what a 
judge interpreting RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision is to make of the 
Supreme Court’s minimal enunciations of the term.  Substantial burdens certainly 
exist when government creates religious coercion by forcing individuals to choose 
between religious commitments and government benefits or punishment.  Sherbert 
and Yoder are two sides of the same coin.  Beyond this framework, the Court has 
never found a substantial burden on free exercise.62  This is hardly a sturdy 
framework on which to rely.  Even the Court has said it does not see meaningful 
substantive differences among the three unemployment cases.63 
Overreliance on the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, then, may lead 
judges interpreting RLUIPA to adopt an overly restrictive and narrow conception 
of a substantial burden.  For example, the Ninth Circuit, in a recent en banc 
opinion, announced that a substantial burden, at least in the context of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, can never exist outside of the Sherbert/Yoder 
framework.64  Such an interpretation does not seem to be what Congress had in 
mind in enacting RLUIPA, for the statute calls for a “constru[ction] in favor of a 
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the 
terms of this Act and the Constitution.”65  Yet the contradiction exists—one that 
has gone unnoted in the literature on RLUIPA.  The drafters did not intend for 
judges to give RLUIPA’s substantial burden term “any broader definition” than the 
Supreme Court has articulated, yet they envisioned a statute to safeguard religious 
 
law could be fined up to $5 or imprisoned for up to three months; the Amish parents involved in Yoder 
were only fined $5 each.  Id. at 207–08. 
 60. Justice Burger’s majority opinion, at over 7,500 words, is over three times longer than Justice 
Brennan’s decision in Sherbert, at just over 2,400 words.  The Court did display particular concern with 
the impact of complying with the state law on the Amish’s traditional lifestyle.  See discussion infra text 
accompanying notes 113–15. 
 61. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (“The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ 
practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively 
compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental 
tenets of their religious beliefs.”). 
 62. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(“[T]he dissent cannot point to a single Supreme Court case where the Court found a substantial burden 
on the free exercise of religion outside the Sherbert/Yoder framework.  The reason is simple:  There is 
none.”). 
 63. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (“We see no 
meaningful distinction among the situations of Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie.”). 
 64. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1069–70 (“Under RFRA, a ‘substantial burden’ is imposed 
only when individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a 
governmental benefit (Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil 
or criminal sanctions (Yoder).  Any burden imposed on the exercise of religion short of that described by 
Sherbert and Yoder is not a ‘substantial burden’ within the meaning of RFRA.. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2012). 
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freedom.66  Interpreting RLUIPA’s land-use substantial burden provision in the 
light of the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, then, seems to be an exercise in 
futility.67 
Two further complications exist.  First, the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence is 
an arena in which every “Hamilton may be matched against a Madison.”68  That is, 
for every case in which the Court found a substantial burden on religion, there is 
another in which the Court declined to find such a burden.69  The Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area is not entirely coherent.  In Braunfeld v. Brown, which 
preceded Sherbert, the Court suggested that a general law advancing secular goals 
will not impose a substantial burden on religion, even if it indirectly affects 
religious observance.70  There, an Orthodox Jewish merchant claimed a state law 
mandating the closure of retail shops on Sunday burdened his free exercise of 
religion.71  Because the state enacted the statute to advance purely secular goals, no 
substantial burden existed.72  And if Yoder represents the high watermark in the 
Court’s free exercise cases, the low watermark is surely Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, where the Court—declining even to apply the Sherbert 
analysis—sanctioned government action that “could have devastating effects on 
traditional Indian religious practices.”73  This is all to say that if judges are to 
interpret RLUIPA’s substantial burden clause with reference to the Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence,74 it is not clear to which jurisprudence they should look.75 
 
 66. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and 
Kennedy). 
 67. Interpreting the substantial burden term in RLUIPA’s prisoner section is a different task 
entirely. 
 68. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.1 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  
 69. Compare Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), Hernandez 
v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989), Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U.S. 599 (1961) (declining to find a substantial burden on religion), with Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding a substantial burden on religion). 
 70. 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). 
 71. Id. at 601. 
 72. Id. at 607. 
 73. 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).  It is not altogether clear that the Lyng court was engaged in 
making a substantial burden determination.  On the one hand, the Court focused heavily on the word 
“prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause and seemed to conclude that the government had enacted no 
prohibitions.  See id.  On the other hand, the respondents framed the case in classic strict scrutiny terms, 
and the Court seemed to accept this framework, even though it disagreed with respondents over whether 
any burden was weighty enough to trigger the compelling governmental interest requirement.  See id. at 
447.  Still, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Smith, did not view Lyng as a case where the Court 
applied the Sherbert framework.  See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
883 (1990) (“In [Lyng,] . . . we declined to apply Sherbert analysis to the Government’s logging and 
road construction activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native American 
Tribes . . . .”). 
 74. Gonzalez v. O Centro is a recent landmark case in the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, but 
its relevance for the present discussion is limited.  See 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  There, the government 
conceded that its law substantially burdened the claimant’s sincere exercise of religion.  Id. at 426.  The 
case turned entirely on whether the uniform application of the law was the least restrictive means of 
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The second—and most significant—objection to interpreting RLUIPA’s 
substantial burden provision through the Court’s case law is not just that the 
Court’s articulation is narrow but that it is not germane.  The discretionary 
distribution of unemployment benefits seemingly has little to do with land use.  
Additionally, individuals are likely to experience religious burdens differently than 
churches and other organizations do.  Even within the context of RLUIPA, land use 
regulations may impede religious exercise in different ways.  For example, a local 
zoning board’s denial of a permit may prevent a church from renovating or 
expanding its facilities.76  In other cases, a zoning ordinance requiring churches to 
apply for a permit to operate in a particular zoning district may effectively bar 
religious institutions from an entire municipality.77  And in the case of architectural 
preservation, a historic landmark designation may entirely prevent a church from 
making any exterior alterations to its structure—a status quo that the Third Church 
described as “religious stasis.”78  Religious institutions subject to land use 
ordinances do not experience burdens in the same way as welfare applicants.79 
Some courts have half-heartedly flagged this problem but have failed to solve it.  
Consider the interpretive move taken by the Second Circuit in Westchester Day 
School v. City of Mamaroneck.80  The case involved a local zoning authority’s 
opposition to the efforts of a Jewish day school to expand its facilities.81  The court 
purports to depart from its sister circuits which use the Sherbert test as “the starting 
point for determining what is a substantial burden under RLUIPA.”82  It noted that 
land use restrictions do not place religious institutions in the same cruel dilemma of 
choosing between faith and a state entitlement:  “When a municipality denies a 
religious institution the right to expand its facilities, it is more difficult to speak of 
substantial pressure to change religious behavior, because in light of the denial the 
renovation simply cannot proceed.”83  Having noted this problem,84 the panel 
curiously adopts a substantial burden standard nearly indistinguishable from those 
 
advancing a compelling governmental interest.  Id. 
 75. The Eleventh Circuit has offered this understatement:  “The Court’s articulation of what 
constitutes a ‘substantial burden’ has varied over time.”  Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 
366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 76. E.g., Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 Fed App’x. 729, 732 (6th 
Cir. 2007); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 345–46 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 77. E.g., Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1219, 1225. 
 78. Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 33, 48. 
 79. Members of religious institutions may in fact experience some burden in a manner akin to 
individuals applying for unemployment benefits, but RLUIPA protects the religious exercise of 
“religious assemb[lies]” and “institution[s]” along with that of individual persons.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc(a)(1) (2012). 
 80. See Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 345. 
 81. Id. at 345–46. 
 82. Id. at 348. 
 83. Id. at 349. 
 84. It is not entirely clear whether the court sees itself as noting a problem or as simply explaining 
why the substantial burden showing will be difficult to establish in the land use context.  This passage in 
the opinion can be read both ways. 
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that it criticizes.85  Adopting a version of the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation, the 
court in Westchester Day School concluded that a substantial burden is one that 
“directly coerces the religious institution to change its behavior.”86  This is 
inadequate because although all land use regulations are coercive in some ways—
restricting desired change even if not requiring change—such laws do not subject 
religious institutions to the same kind of cruel dilemma that was at the heart of 
Sherbert:  that of choosing between abiding by one’s religious conscience and 
receiving government benefits.  Rather, the primary burden imposed by land use 
regulations is that it locks institutions into a religious stasis.  Thus, the Second 
Circuit’s Westchester Day School is simply not much of a departure from the 
Sherbert/Yoder framework. 
There are two immediate objections to the Second Circuit’s formulation.  First, 
as noted, it is nearly identical to the standard found in the unemployment trilogy, 
which the Second Circuit identifies as unworkable, or at least difficult to apply, in 
the land use context.  It is hard to divine a difference between “substantial pressure 
to modify behavior” and “direct coercion to change behavior.”  Second, the 
Westchester Day School panel styles its standard after the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach:  “significant pressure which directly coercers [a church] . . . to 
conform . . . [its] behavior.”87  The Eleventh Circuit derives this formulation, 
though, by collecting the Supreme Court’s free exercise cases88—the exact 
interpretive move that the Second Circuit sees as having limited usefulness. 
In summary, the Supreme Court’s free exercise line of cases has limited 
usefulness in constructing a workable understanding of what is a “substantial 
burden” under RLUIPA.  The formulations offered by the Court do not make sense 
in the context of land use restrictions that restrict a religious institution from 
undertaking a desired course of action.  The Second Circuit’s interpretative 
gymnastics in Westchester Day School illustrate the trouble with grounding an 
interpretation of RLUIPA in the Court’s jurisprudence and, perhaps more 
importantly, of attempting even to develop a talismanic incantation at all.  Finally, 
it bears noting that for all the scrutiny the circuits have devoted to the 
Sherbert/Yoder framework in their RLUIPA cases,89 neither Sherbert nor Yoder 
ever use the phrase “substantial burden.”90 
 
 85. The Westchester Day School court attempts to frame its test in reaction to the Fourth Circuit’s 
own standard in Lovelace v. Lee, an inmate case that held that for RLUIPA purposes, a substantial 
burden exists when government puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs.”  Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. 
of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Dev., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)). 
 86. Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 349. 
 87. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 88. Id. at 1226–27. 
 89. There is also an important body of cases that interprets “substantial burden” under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  One notable example is Mack v. O’Leary.  See 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 
(7th Cir. 1996).  Early RLUIPA decisions relied on such cases, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers 
v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003), but there is at this point a sufficiently robust RLUIPA 
corpus such that it is no longer necessary to rely on older RFRA decisions. 
 90. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), spoke of a “burden on the free exercise of . . . 
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B.  “ORDINARY, CONTEMPORARY, COMMON MEANING” 
A second, predictable approach to interpreting RLUIPA’s substantial burden 
provision is recourse to plain meaning.  RLUIPA offers no definition of substantial 
burden, so the canons of construction would suggest that courts, as the Eleventh 
Circuit purportedly did, give “the term its ordinary or natural meaning.”91  This is 
no easy task.  Although “substantial burden” does in fact have something like a 
plain meaning,92 the history of the term and the way it functions in Supreme Court 
opinions suggest that the jurisprudential meaning diverges in important ways from 
the plain meaning.  RLUIPA treats the phrase as a term of art, as evidenced by the 
expectation that the term would mean whatever the Supreme Court has used it to 
mean.93  Where the statute in question utilizes a phrase as a term of art, courts 
should attempt to do so as well.  And it is the nature of a term of art to convey 
meaning by reference to a specialized body of knowledge and to depart from 
ordinary usage.94  Interpreting RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision is not 
analogous to determining what “modify” or “personnel” means in a particular 
statute.95  Terms of art should not fall on what plain meaning dictates or what the 
dictionary says.96  Whatever “substantial burdens” means, it is the operative term in 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a).  Indeed, Congress titled this section of the statute 
“Substantial burdens.”97 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of RLUIPA illustrates the mistake of relying 
on plain meaning.  In San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, the court 
looked to “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” to interpret the substantial 
 
religion,” and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972), of a government law that “unduly burdens” 
religion.  The origins of the use of “substantial burden” as shorthand for a restriction on free exercise 
sufficiently great to trigger a compelling interest inquiry is unclear.  Credit is perhaps due to Justice 
Marshall and his opinion in Hernandez v. Comm’r.  There, Justice Marshall explained:  “The free 
exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central 
religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.”  
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).  The term, in the context of free exercise, then began 
to resurface with regularity in the Court’s opinions.  See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of  Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
 91. Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1226.  Though the Eleventh Circuit claims to use plain 
meaning as its starting point, it does so by relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s articulations of 
“substantial burden.”  See id. at 1226–27. 
 92. For example, if one says, “That’s a substantial financial burden to me!” we have a sense of 
what that person means. 
 93. See 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). 
 94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (9th ed. 2009) (“A word or phrase having a specific, precise 
meaning in a given specialty, apart from its general meaning in ordinary contexts.”). 
 95. See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011) (discussing the meaning of “personnel” 
in the context of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)); MCI Telecommunications 
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (discussing the meaning of “modify” in the context 
of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)). 
 96. But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005) (defining “economics” in the context of 
the Commerce Clause with a dictionary definition). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2012). 
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burden provision.98  The case concerned a religious school’s attempts to construct 
educational facilities.99  The Ninth Circuit panel resolved to ground its 
interpretation in plain meaning, which led it to turn to the pages of the 
dictionary.100  Using Black’s Law Dictionary, it defined “burden” as “something 
that is oppressive,” and relying on Merriam-Webster’s, it defined “substantial” as 
“significantly great.”101  From these definitions, it concluded that a substantial 
burden on religious exercise “must impose a significantly great restriction or onus 
upon such exercise.”102  The words “substantial” and “burden” each independently 
may be of ordinary usage, but it does not syllogistically follow that “substantial 
burden” can be deconstructed so simply.103  The Ninth Circuit’s formulation is too 
vague to yield practical substantive meaning.104 
It is equally, if not more, unworkable as Thomas’ “substantial pressure” test to 
determine when a land use restriction infringes religious freedom so greatly that it 
can only be justified by a compelling interest.  Under the facts of San Jose 
Christian College, it is unclear how a court could determine whether the city’s land 
development requirements imposed a significantly great onus on the school’s 
religious exercise.105  Even the Ninth Circuit itself, sitting en banc, later criticized 
its plain meaning reading of the substantial burden provision:  “That ‘substantial 
burden’ means ‘a significantly great restriction or onus’ says nothing about what 
kind or level of restriction is ‘significantly great.’”106  Such an approach provides 
little, if any, guidance to courts in determining whether impositions on free exercise 
are unlawful under RLUIPA. 
The problem with the San Jose Christian College reading of the statute is not 
just the lack of guidance it provides but its propensity to serve as an artifice with 
which judges can support their outcomes in particular cases.  It is less a test than a 
label a court can stamp onto its conclusion.  The malleability of the Ninth Circuit’s 
formulation lends it to arbitrary application.  For example, the court in San Jose 
Christian College ultimately applied its newly invented “significantly great onus” 
test and determined that the city’s denial of the college’s rezoning application did 
not amount to a substantial burden on religion.107  Two years later, in 2006, the 
 
 98. 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing A-Z Int’l. v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 99. Id. at 1027–29. 
 100. Id. at 1034. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Congress used “substantial burden” as a term of art in RLUIPA.  Although “substantial 
burden” may convey some ordinary meaning, this is not how the term is used in the statute.  See 
discussion supra text accompanying notes 92–97.  
 104. It is questionable how much more precise the court could be, but that quandary illustrates the 
limited usefulness of vague formulations:  they are only capable of conveying so much meaning. 
 105. In most RLUIPA cases, there is no issue whether religious exercise is involved because the 
statute defines religion exercise as including “[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the 
purpose of religious exercise.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (2012). 
 106. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 107. San Jose Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1035–36. 
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Ninth Circuit in another religious land use case applied the same test but found that 
a city’s denial of a conditional use permit for a religious institution did present a 
substantial burden.108  That two different panels reached different conclusions 
under the same standard in cases with different facts is not itself revealing.  What is 
relevant, though, is the minimal role the Ninth Circuit’s formulation plays in the 
analysis of the facts in each case.  Each court anchors its result in the Ninth 
Circuit’s definition of a substantial burden, but the test can hardly be detected in the 
background of either court’s analysis.  The ability of the Ninth Circuit’s 
formulation to buttress conflicting outcomes is not surprising, for vacuous words 
make for fickle standards. 
RLUIPA interlocutors inclined to honor the statute’s plain meaning are also 
likely to emphasize that any reading must emphasize the role of the adjective 
“substantial” in modifying “burden.”  That is, to adhere to the canon of statutory 
construction requiring that each word in a statute should be endowed with meaning, 
a court must formulate an interpretation that bestows meaning on “substantial” as a 
modifier.  This is a principle the Seventh Circuit has taken to heart in various 
RLUIPA decisions.109  For instance, Judge Posner argues:  “Any land-use 
regulation that a church would like not to have to comply with imposes a ‘burden’ 
on it, and so the adjective ‘substantial’ must be taken seriously lest RLUIPA be 
interpreted to grant churches a blanket immunity from land use regulation.”110  In a 
different Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Bauer also expressed concern about 
interpreting RLUIPA in a way that would “render meaningless the word 
‘substantial.’”111  The use of the word “substantial” does seem to imply that 
Congress foresaw some minor burdens on religious exercise that would not trigger 
RLUIPA’s compelling interest requirement.  But the Seventh Circuit, in its desire 
to avoid vitiating the meaning in “substantial,” ignores other interpretive 
possibilities that focus less on statutory syntax. 
Judge Posner’s observation that any land use restriction that a church wishes to 
avoid amounts to a burden is not necessarily correct.  His statement assumes what 
may seem self-evident to him but what other courts view as contestable:  that 
whether a burden on a church exists is determined solely by whether the church 
feels it is burdened.112  To understand this point, consider the example of a 
schoolboy struggling with hours of homework each night.  The homework prevents 
him from pursuing his hobbies, and he feels burdened.  It is a fair assessment to say 
the boy is burdened.  Now assume that the boy receives only ten minutes of 
homework each night but that he whines miserably about it.  The effects of the 
 
 108. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 109. See, e.g., World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2009); Civil 
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 110. World Outreach Conference Ctr., 591 F.3d at 539. 
 111. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761. 
 112. Such a view is not necessarily misguided, but neither is it necessarily correct.  As discussed 
below, such a view is, if not misguided, at least problematic in that it aggravates constitutional problems 
by requiring courts to make religious judgments.  See discussion infra text accompanying notes 122–26. 
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homework on the boy may be great and the boy may feel burdened, but an 
objective observer may reasonably conclude that there is no burden and that the 
problem is with the boy and not with any overbearing teacher.  Assume once more 
that the child receives thirty minutes of homework each night but that he is the only 
student in his class given any homework.  The thirty minutes of work itself may not 
be a burden, but an objective observer might reasonably conclude that targeting the 
boy for selective treatment is burdensome.  So too with churches.  In this light, one 
can find error in Judge Posner’s statement that any land use regulation that a church 
would like not to have to comply with imposes a burden on it.  That is only true if 
the church’s perspective is the only one that matters and if a court only considers 
the effects of a government action on a religious institution. 
One can broadly differentiate, then, between two approaches to interpreting and 
applying RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision:  one focuses exclusively on the 
effects of a challenged state regulation on a church, and the other considers effects 
along with other factors like the manner in which the state regulation is applied to 
the church.  Each offers benefits along with pitfalls. 
Courts that emphasize a plain meaning interpretation of RLUIPA also tend to 
adopt the effects-based view of substantial burden.  For example, the Ninth Circuit 
panel in Guru Nanak Sikh Society v. County of Sutter adhered to a plain meaning 
approach, and its finding that the county had imposed a substantial burden was 
predicated on “the net effect” of the county’s denial of a permit on the religious 
institution’s ability to find a suitable parcel of land within the county.113  The 
effects-based interpretation also appears to jive with the Sherbert/Yoder 
framework, which—at least at first glance—emphasizes the effects of the state 
action on individuals’ free exercise.  The Court’s ostensible concern in the Sherbert 
trilogy was not whether government was targeting Seventh-day Adventists and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses,114 but with how Ms. Sherbert and Mr. Thomas experienced 
state action.  Similarly, Chief Justice Burger’s sympathies in Yoder were with the 
Yoder family and the “impact of the compulsory-attendance law on . . . the Amish 
religion.”115  An interpretation of substantial burden under RLUIPA, then, which 
prioritizes how the church experiences the state action appears to have the benefit 
of fidelity to the statute’s plain language and of not stretching the ordinary meaning 
of words. 
The problem, though, is that the possibility exists that it is a misreading—or, at 
least, a myopic reading—of Sherbert and a misconstruction of the Court’s other 
free exercise cases to suggest they establish a purely effects-based approach in 
which the substantial burden determination is made solely by looking at how an 
individual experiences the challenged state action.  Sherbet states directly that the 
opinion is limited to situations in which a state arbitrarily applies a law in a way 
 
 113. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis 
added). 
 114. For a discussion of the significance, in RLUIPA cases, of government actors targeting 
religious minorities, see infra text accompanying notes 181–94.  
 115. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). 
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that stifles religious exercise.116  That is, Sherbert perhaps is not exclusively about 
how individuals experience state action but is also in part about how the state 
applies its own laws.  Often overlooked in Sherbert is the Court’s statement:  “Our 
holding is only that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility 
provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions . . . .”117  
This focus on state action and behavior is consistent with Justice Douglas’ pithy 
observation that “the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the 
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can 
exact from the government.”118 
The Court has also emphatically rejected the notion that a purely effects-based 
approach is proper in applying the substantial burden standard; the line between 
unconstitutional infringements on religious freedom and legitimate government 
conduct “cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a 
religious objector’s spiritual development.”119  This rejection of a purely effect-
based approach helps explain the result in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of 
Equalization, where the Court found that a generally applicable tax that had the 
effect of decreasing the amount of money the petitioner had to spend on religious 
activities did not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise.120  Even in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, where the Court did find 
a substantial burden on religion, the Court rejected an effects-focused analysis in 
favor of one emphasizing the “impermissible object” of the challenged law.121 
There is, however, a more serious objection to determining the substantiality of 
the burden through a primary focus on how the church experiences state action:  the 
effects-centered approach is fatally flawed because it requires courts to assess the 
relative religious importance of church beliefs and practices—inquiries that courts 
are generally ill-suited to undertake.  Professors Lupu and Tuttle underscore this 
point in an important recent article.122  They argue that courts are unable to 
appraise questions that are uniquely religious in nature.123  Any “jurisprudence that 
propels judges into evaluation of such questions is a contra-constitutional excursion 
into appraising theological questions,” they claim.124  The purely effects-based 
approach to applying RLUIPA’s substantial burden term invites “judgments [that] 
are not just about religion.  They are religious judgments about the meaning or 
 
 116. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 119. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (emphasis added); 
see also discussion supra note 73.  
 120. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990). 
 121. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) 
(emphasis added).  Impermissible targeting of a religious group is a separate basis to strike down a law.  
City of Hialeah empowers courts to strike down laws directed against a particular religion, even if the 
burden imposed does not rise to the level of substantiality.  See id. 
 122. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of Religious Accommodation:  
The Case of RLUIPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907 (2011).  
 123. Id. at 1916–1919. 
 124. Id. at 1916–1917. 
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relative significance of beliefs or practices within a particular tradition . . . [which] 
fall outside the secular competence of government officials.”125  In the context of 
RLUIPA, Professors Lupu and Tuttle suggest that courts should interpret the statute 
in a way that avoids religious judgments.  They view RLUIPA’s substantial burden 
provision as the most “troublesome” in the statute and envision few viable 
solutions to the problem they address.126 
The problem is most severe, though, only if one accepts the view that a court 
should evaluate the substantiality of the burden by looking exclusively at whether 
the church feels it is burdened.  By moving away from the view that it is the 
church’s perspective alone that matters, one mitigates Professors Lupu and Tuttle’s 
problem.  It is productive, then, to consider effects on the church along with factors 
associated with the manner in which a state applies its regulation to a church.  
Indeed, this Note shows in the final Part that it is these factors that courts actually 
focus on in deciding land use cases under RLUIPA.127 
C.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EXAMPLE 
The above discussion of the two dominant approaches to interpreting RLUIPA’s 
substantial burden provision does not place much faith in the potential for vague 
formulations to resolve the most puzzling RLUIPA cases.  To see further why such 
formulations promise much but deliver little, it is instructive to consider the course 
charted by the Seventh Circuit, which, in contrast to its sister circuits, has had the 
most opportunity to refine and apply its own “substantial burden” formulation.128  
The Seventh Circuit was also one of the first federal appellate courts to construe 
RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision in the land use context, so it did not have 
the benefit (or detriment) of being able to follow the lead of other circuits.129 
The Seventh Circuit’s early attempt to interpret RLUIPA is admirable, if not 
ultimately successful.  The court attempted to offer an articulation of “substantial 
burden” under RLUIPA that was workable and flexible while not vacuous; it tried 
to ground its formulation in the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence while 
reformulating it for the context of land use regulations.  In 2003, in one of the 
earliest cases attempting to define RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision, a group 
of churches claimed their free exercise was substantially burdened by Chicago’s 
zoning scheme.130  That case, Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of 
Chicago, led the Seventh Circuit to offer this formulation:  “a land-use regulation 
that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears 
 
 125. Id. at 1927. 
 126. Id. at 1936, 1930–31. 
 127. See infra Part III. 
 128. See World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2009); Vision 
Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2006); Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox 
Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. 
City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 129. E.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 752. 
 130. Id. at 755–59.  
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direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . 
effectively impracticable.”131  The formulation is, on its face, startlingly narrow and 
would seem to permit a broad host of land use regulations.  The Seventh Circuit 
panel appeared to have had several considerations in mind when developing this 
standard.  Paramount among these was a desire to balance RLUIPA’s “broad 
definition of religious exercise” with a narrow definition of substantial burden.132 
The Civil Liberties for Urban Believers panel also appeared concerned with the 
canon of construction that every word in a statute should be endowed with 
independent meaning.  If Congress intended every obstacle to religious exercise to 
trigger RLUIPA’s compelling interest test, the court reasoned, Congress would not 
have modified “burden” with the adjective “substantial.”  As the court reasoned, 
“Application of the substantial burden provision to a regulation inhibiting or 
constraining any religious exercise . . . would render meaningless the word 
‘substantial,’ because the slightest obstacle to religious exercise . . . could then 
constitute a burden sufficient to trigger RLUIPA’s [compelling governmental 
interest requirement].”133  This is a principle that Judge Posner would defend in a 
later RLUIPA case.134 
A final motivating principle for the Seventh Circuit in Civil Liberties for Urban 
Believers was its interest in devising a formulation that encompassed the market 
factors unique to the disposal of real property within a municipality.  The court 
reasoned that conditions simply inherent in land use—such as the cost of land and 
the permit-approval process—should not give rise to a substantial burden on 
religion.135  In the court’s view, “[t]he harsh reality of the marketplace sometimes 
dictates that certain facilities are not available to those who desire them.”136  Civil 
Liberties involved a group of churches attempting to acquire property within 
Chicago’s city limits.137  The situation is a bit different in historic preservation 
cases, where a church may wish not to acquire property in a city but to alter its 
existing structure.  Still, what is relevant was the Seventh Circuit’s interest in 
interpreting the substantial burden provision in a way that was mindful of the 
specificities of the land use context.  The court suggested that a church cannot show 
a substantial burden when it encounters the same land use difficulties it would face 
as a nonreligious organization.138  The panel emphasized that a land use regulation 
does not impose a substantial burden simply because it requires a church to spend 
more money than it would in the absence of the regulation.139 
Although the Civil Liberties for Urban Believers formulation is ultimately 
 
 131. Id. at 761. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. 
 134. See World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2009); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 109–11.  
 135. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.2d at 761. 
 136. Id. (quoting Love Church v. City of Evanston, 896 F.2d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 137. Id. at 755–59. 
 138. Id. at 761. 
 139. Id. at 761–62. 
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problematic, this early Seventh Circuit formulation is admirable because it was 
seemingly developed thoughtfully and in a less haphazard manner than that shown 
by other federal courts of appeals.  But even the Seventh Circuit’s “effectively 
impracticable” standard has proven to be of limited usefulness as the court has 
encountered diverse land use cases under RLUIPA.  The land use context in Civil 
Liberties involved a challenge to Chicago’s zoning scheme.140  Professors Lupu 
and Tuttle find this type of case untroublesome because they believe courts can 
decide such cases without making religious judgments.141  To decide these cases, 
courts can “examine the relevant zoning map and real estate market to determine 
whether the claimant had other sites reasonably available and approved for its 
desired use.”142  For the most part, that is how the Civil Liberties panel decided the 
case and concluded that the claimants could not show a substantial burden.143 
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit in a similar case tried to retreat from—
without overruling—its Civil Liberties for Urban Believers formulation.144  Sts. 
Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin also 
involved a church challenging a city’s zoning ordinance, but the case presented a 
sympathetic plaintiff, and the panel labored to distinguish the zoning scheme from 
that in Civil Liberties.145  No longer did establishing a substantial burden require a 
church “to show that there was no other parcel of land on which it could build its 
church.”146  In Greek Orthodox Church, the court concluded that a substantial 
burden existed.147  It is not itself remarkable that the two cases produced different 
results.  But the two cases do not read like they were written by the same court.  
Further, Judge Evans joined the panel decision in each case, so the different 
outcomes cannot simply be explained by different benches.  As discussed below in 
Part III.A, several factors can help reconcile the cases, but what is noteworthy for 
present purposes is the unsatisfactory role that the Seventh Circuit’s formulation 
plays in Greek Orthodox Church.148  This suggests that the Civil Liberties 
formulation may have been a standard good for one day only—a problem found in 
other circuits as well.  Greek Orthodox Church offers an example of how 
successfully to decide a complicated RLUIPA case, but to paraphrase Judge 
Posner, one must follow not what the courts of appeals say they are doing but what 
they actually do.149 
The “effectively impracticable” standard rears its head in two additional 
 
 140. Id. at 755–59.  
 141. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 122, at 1928–29. 
 142. Id. at 1929. 
 143. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 762. 
 144. See Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 
895 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 145. Id. at 899–900. 
 146. Id. at 899. 
 147. Id. at 901. 
 148. See infra text accompanying notes 170–76.  
 149. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 769 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, 
J., dissenting) (“We should follow what the Supreme Court does and not just what it says it is doing.”). 
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significant RLUIPA decisions.  The claimant in Vision Church v. Village of Long 
Grove was a church contesting a municipality’s annexation of its vacant property, 
previously unincorporated land.150  Though the court determined that the church 
could not establish a substantial burden, what is significant is the minimal role that 
the Seventh Circuit’s formulation plays in the actual analysis.151  The court recites 
its formulation but then seemingly does not know how to apply it in a case with 
different facts than those found in Civil Liberties.152  Vision Church illustrates the 
limited usefulness of the circuit’s formulation. 
Finally, there is the Seventh Circuit’s 2009 decision in World Outreach 
Conference Center v. City of Chicago, where Judge Posner did not even pay lip 
service to the Circuit’s substantial burden formulation—or those used by any other 
circuit.  The court consolidated two RLUIPA cases, deciding one in favor of the 
religious organization and one in favor of the city.153  For present purposes, what is 
relevant is that Judge Posner did not outright reject the vague formulations; he 
simply ignored them.  The case is one of the most recent to assess a substantial 
burden claim under RLUIPA,154 and so it is too soon to tell whether the case will 
signal a shift away from courts’ reliance on vague formulations. 
D.  COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST 
There is another piece of the puzzle not yet explored.  It is worth keeping in 
mind that the requisite showing that a substantial burden exists does not in itself 
invalidate a land use regulation.  After a religious organization establishes that a 
substantial burden hinders its free exercise, the burden shifts to the state to advance 
a compelling interest to justify the infringement—what Professors Lupu and Tuttle 
see as “a secular inquiry that avoids any need to consider religious questions.”155  
Of the roughly dozen major federal appellate cases interpreting the substantial 
burden provision in the land use context, none feature the compelling state interest 
requirement prominently.156  This is surprising, for in cases where the court finds a 
 
 150. Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 151. Id. at 997–1000. 
 152. See id. at 997. 
 153. See infra text accompanying notes 177–81.  
 154. Along with World Outreach Conference Center, the other most recent cases to apply 
RLUIPA’s substantial provision in a significant way in the land use context are Fortress Bible Church v. 
Feiner, 694 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2012), and Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 
F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 155. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 122, at 1930. 
 156. In cases in which courts answer the threshold substantial burden question in the negative, 
courts logically do not reach the compelling state interest inquiry.  E.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town 
of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Because we cannot say that the [city] imposes a 
substantial burden on religious exercise, . . . [w]e need not reach the question of whether Surfside can 
justify the burden created by articulating a compelling government interest . . . .”).  But even in cases 
where courts do find a substantial burden, they still tend to avoid the difficult compelling interest 
analysis.  See, e.g., Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 
F.3d 895, 900–01 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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substantial burden, RLUIPA then requires courts to apply a strict scrutiny standard 
in evaluating state interests.  Westchester Day School is unusual in that it devotes a 
full three paragraphs even to acknowledging the role of the compelling interest 
requirement.157 
One explanation for why the compelling state interest test does not play a more 
prominent role in RLUIPA cases may be that judges are loath, once they conclude a 
substantial burden exists, to find that a government interest is compelling enough to 
justify the harm on religious freedom.  The kinds of state interests justifying land 
use regulations are likely to relate to things like traffic, open space and noise—not 
exactly concerns that make it easy for a judge to explain why religious 
infringement is justified.  It seems the rare case where a municipality can 
legitimately claim that its land use regulation is justified by an interest in something 
like national security or public health.  In the case of historic and architectural 
preservation, the interest that is at stake is almost certainly a purely aesthetic one—
a tough sell as a “compelling” interest. 
A second reason courts may downplay the strict scrutiny portion of RLUIPA is 
that the compelling interest requirement makes a difficult determination even more 
difficult.  Just as there is no consensus about what constitutes a substantial burden, 
there is far from any accord about what makes certain interests compelling enough 
to survive strict scrutiny in religious freedom cases.  The Supreme Court, for one, 
has never clarified precisely what makes certain government interests compelling.  
It has occasionally offered general guidance, such as when it characterized 
compelling interests as “those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise 
served.”158  This provides little direction to courts in RLUIPA cases tasked with 
evaluating whether a government interest is weighty enough to justify a state 
action.159  Justice Blackmun sagely noted that he could never fully “appreciate just 
what a ‘compelling state interest’ is.”160  Perhaps cognizant of Professor Gunther’s 
quip that strict scrutiny was “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,”161 Justice 
Blackmun recognized that if “compelling governmental interest” means “‘incapable 
of being overcome,’ upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely 
announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all.”162 
It may be for these reasons that RLUIPA cases seem to turn almost entirely on 
 
 157. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 158. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 159. Professor Winkler, in a fascinating empirical study of strict scrutiny in the federal courts, 
demonstrates that strict scrutiny has never been as “strict” in religion cases as it is in race and free 
speech cases.  He finds that religious liberty cases have “the highest survival rate of any area of law in 
which strict scrutiny applies:  59 percent, more than double the mean of the other doctrinal categories.”  
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:  An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 857–58 (2006).   
 160. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 161. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword:  In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). 
 162. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 188 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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the substantial burden determination.  Hence, this Note devotes its attention to the 
substantial burden term, which, at least for the foreseeable future, does the heavy 
lifting in RLUIPA cases. 
III. 
The various opinions of the courts of appeals offer a pastiche of RLUIPA 
interpretative principles from which it is quite difficult to glean a coherent picture.  
Courts, going forward, lack a stable framework to apply in historic preservation 
and other land use cases.  One approach—the dominant one and arguably a 
legitimate one—holds that “substantial burden” is a vague phrase and that churches 
can satisfy the standard by showing something more than a minimal burden.  This 
Note suggests that a different approach altogether is appropriate and would be 
instructive for courts to adopt.  If the roughly dozen regnant circuit opinions 
interpreting RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision in land use cases demonstrate 
anything, it is that no single interpretation is ideal.  Interpretative problems arise 
when courts attempt to derive some single talismanic formulation. 
This Note  has attempted to illuminate problems with some of the most common 
approaches courts have taken—particularly reliance on Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and recourse to ordinary meaning.  Even within the land use context, 
the gamut of factual scenarios is too diverse to rely on any single bright-line 
“definition” of substantial burden.  It is unwise that the circuits (namely, the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh) have attempted to do so.  The 
use—and misuse—of different formulations has engendered poor RLUIPA 
decisions.  Even when results may be correct, reasoning may be tortured, as courts 
try to conform their reasoning to their various arbitrary formulations.  Something 
more is needed in the way courts treat RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” language. 
In interpreting RLUIPA, courts ought to do something other than engage in a 
game of legal Mad Libs.  The circuits’ RLUIPA decisions provide sufficient data 
points through which it is possible to construct a best-fit line that can be used to 
gauge how courts should decide RLUIPA cases in the future.  That is, this Note 
attempts not to articulate how courts say they decide land use cases but to elucidate 
how they actually decide the cases.  The decisions often turn on a variety of factors 
which courts do not address specifically but which can be determinative.  Thus, this 
Part offers a multifactor approach that courts can employ to resolve RLUIPA 
disputes in lieu of relying on any one formulation.  This approach has the potential 
to serve as an alternative navigational tool judges can use to wade through 
RLUIPA’s interpretative thicket.  At the very least, it can provide judges with a 
complimentary approach that casts new light on how they view the vague 
substantial burden formulations. 
Finally, a few words are in order regarding the use of a multifactor paradigm.  
Any multifactor or totality-of-the-circumstances approach is necessarily malleable, 
and this Note has questioned the enduring feasibility of vague formulations, in part, 
because they fail to provide courts with guidance.  It would not do to replace one 
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uninstructive approach with an equally obscure one.  Yet there is an important 
distinction between malleability and meaninglessness.  It is not simply the case that 
the vague formulations are malleable; rather, the problem is that they are void of 
meaning.  Courts, with no viable alternative, cite them but then proceed to decide 
RLUIPA cases in a seemingly haphazard way, leaving the vague formulations in 
the dust.  Any alternative approach, even a malleable multifactored one, would 
seem to be an improvement.  Accordingly, the multifactor paradigm developed in 
Part III attempts to make sense of the seeming haphazardness.  Divergent cases that 
appear difficult to reconcile through the lens of the vague formulations may, in fact, 
be rationally explained when viewed through a different prism. 
A.  FOUR FACTORS 
One factor that courts might look to in evaluating substantiality is whether the 
municipality’s land use decision was fair and impartial or whether it was unduly 
influenced by special interests.  A process that is decisively skewed toward special 
interests may pose a procedural due process violation, but often the facts are not 
overt enough to establish this.  The facts may instead be hazy, such that one can 
only glean the taint of impropriety.  Certain impropriety may also not rise to the 
level of an outright due process violation.  Consider the Westchester Day School 
case, discussed above.  Recall that the case involved a Jewish day school’s efforts 
to expand its facilities.163  The case is best known for the Second Circuit’s 
development and elucidation of its substantial burden formulation.164  It is also 
noteworthy for the court’s reaction to what it seemed to perceive as nimbyism. 
In October 2001, Westchester Day School applied to the Mamaroneck zoning 
board for a permit to undergo a $12 million expansion that would create a dozen 
new classrooms and substantial multipurpose educational space.165  In February 
2002, the five-member zoning board unanimously gave the project a green light.166  
The court notes that opposition then formed from a “small but vocal group” in the 
community, and in August, the zoning board reversed course and rescinded its 
approval.167  The court did not offer direct evidence linking the two, and no due 
process issue was before the court.  Nonetheless, a current of suspicion of the 
zoning board runs through the court’s opinion.  The court noted that the zoning 
board’s “stated reasons” for blocking the school were “conceived after the [board] 
closed its hearing.”168  The court also pointed out that the district court judge 
believed the board denied the school’s permit because it “gave undue deference to 
 
 163. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 344–46 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 164. In a recent 2012 opinion, the Second Circuit further developed and refined its interpretation of 
RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision.  See Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 218–220 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
 165. Id. at 345. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 346. 
 168. Id. 
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the public opposition of the small but influential group of neighbors.”169  The court 
concluded that a substantial burden existed, but its opinion seemed to turn less on 
its newly constructed formulation than on its belief that the zoning board acted with 
“an arbitrary blindness to the facts.”170 
Other cases, as well, seem to turn on intangible factors in which cities act with 
bad faith.  For example, in Greek Orthodox Church, the court seemed to have little 
patience for what it viewed as the city’s masked hostility to religion171—a second 
significant relevant factor.  The Greek Orthodox congregation wished to rezone a 
portion of its vacant property so that it could construct a church building.172  
Despite abiding by all regulations, it was repeatedly frustrated by the municipal 
bureaucracy, which committed “repeated legal errors.”173  It was “obvious” to the 
court that the town “unless deeply confused about the law, was playing a delaying 
game.”174  This led the court to state, “If a land-use decision, in this case the denial 
of a zoning variance, imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise . . . and the 
decision maker cannot justify it, the inference arises that hostility to religion . . . 
influenced the decision.”175 
Similar to the impropriety lurking in the actions of the zoning board in 
Westchester Day School, the town’s possible hostility to religion in Greek 
Orthodox Church is not overt enough to present a constitutional violation itself.  
Outright discrimination against religious organizations would directly violate the 
Free Exercise Clause.176  Discrimination may occur, however, without it being 
possible to establish overt targeting. 
The same factor—subtle hostility to religion—also helps explain the outcome in 
World Outreach Conference Center, where the court found that the City of Chicago 
interfered with a religious group’s mission in a way that would violate RLUIPA.177  
There, the claimant wished to operate a religious YMCA-like community center, 
but the city erected numerous bureaucratic hurdles to prevent the center from 
operating.178  It even filed a “frivolous” lawsuit against the center.179  This is a case 
where evaluating the substantiality of the religious group’s burden using an abstract 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 352. 
 171. It is not clear whether this masked hostility was directed at religion generally or specifically at 
the Greek Orthodox.  There is reason to suspect the latter, see infra text accompanying notes 182–84, 
but one reaches the same conclusion either way.  The factors brought to light in Part III are not 
mandatory criteria that must be met for a church to show substantiality, but rather are lenses that courts 
can apply to different cases to understand what is occurring.  
 172. Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 
898 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 173. Id. at 899. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 900. 
 176. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 
(1993) (“[A] law targeting religious beliefs . . . is never permissible.”). 
 177. World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 537–38 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 178. Id. at 536–37. 
 179. Id. at 536. 
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formulation would be neither simple nor productive.  The totality of the 
circumstances, though, made it a simple case for Judge Posner, who astutely 
focused on the overall “picture painted by the complaint.”180  From this overall 
picture, Judge Posner could glean “malicious prosecution of a religious 
organization by City officials.”181  This helps explain the outcome in the case in a 
more satisfactory way than any vague formulation could. 
A third factor that is significant in RLUIPA cases is whether there are reasons to 
think a city is treating a religious group differently based on the identity of the 
religion.  Again, any overt targeting would violate the Free Exercise Clause, but 
churches may be unable to establish as much.  Issues about the identity of the 
religion have long played a role in free exercise jurisprudence.  In Yoder, for 
example, Chief Justice Burger’s adoration of the pastoral life of the Amish led 
Justice Douglas to wonder “how the Catholics, Episcopalians, the Baptists, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Unitarians, and my own Presbyterians would make out if 
subjected” to the Court’s reasoning.182  In Greek Orthodox Church, Judge Posner 
noted that the congregation’s property was bordered by a plot of land that was 
owned by a different Protestant denomination and that the town had consented to 
rezone that land to allow a church to be built—exactly what the Greek Orthodox 
claimant sought to do.183  Judge Posner was particularly concerned about the “the 
vulnerability of religious institutions—especially those not affiliated with the 
mainstream Protestant sects or the Roman Catholic Church—to subtle forms of 
discrimination . . . .”184  Courts in the future should follow suit and be particularly 
attuned to subtle forms of religious discrimination when they make substantial 
burden determinations. 
Subtle hostility to a less mainstream religious group can also help explain the 
outcome in Guru Nanak Sikh Society, the Ninth Circuit case where the court found 
that a county’s repeated denials of a construction permit presented a substantial 
burden for a small Sikh temple.185  In 2001, the tiny congregation applied for a 
permit to construct a temple on its two-acre parcel of land.186  At a public meeting, 
the planning commission voted to deny the permit, “based on citizens’ voiced fears 
that the resulting noise and traffic would interfere with the existing 
neighborhood.”187  Rather than contest the decision, Guru Nanak acquired a new 
thirty-acre lot in a rural, unincorporated area of the country.188  It again applied for 
 
 180. Id. at 537. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 246 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).  What is 
telling is that Justice Douglas in Yoder was thinking about the role that the Amish religion in 
particular—opposed to religion in general—played in the Court’s analysis. 
 183. Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 
898 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 184. Id. at 900. 
 185. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 186. Id. at 981–82. 
 187. Id. at 982. 
 188. Id. 
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a permit to build a small seventy-five-person temple on its large parcel, and it 
agreed to all the county’s conditions.189  At the public meeting, neighbors again 
“spoke against the proposed temple, complaining mainly that the temple would 
increase traffic and noise, interfere with the agricultural use of their land, and lower 
property values.”190  The commission voted to approve the permit by a one-person 
margin.191  The neighbors appealed the decision to the county board of supervisors, 
which unanimously reversed the commission’s decision and denied the temple its 
permit.192  It is with this background that the court decided the case. 
The county’s faintly veiled hostility to the Sikh temple more satisfactorily 
explains why the court found that a substantial burden existed than does the 
application of the Ninth Circuit’s vague formulation to the case.  To be sure, the 
court in Guru Nanak did purport to “[a]pply[] San Jose Christian College’s 
definition of a substantial burden”—a significantly great restriction or onus upon 
religious exercise—“to the particular facts” of the case, but that does not get one 
very far.193  Rather, the actual factor that led the court to decide the way it did was 
the county’s impudent treatment of the Sikh temple.  For example, the court noted 
with concern that “Guru Nanak readily agreed to every mitigation measure 
suggested . . . but the County, without explanation, found such cooperation 
insufficient.”194  The court never outright accused the county of discriminating 
against Sikhs, but it had no problem making out the overall picture. 
This case also highlights a fourth factor that leads courts to find substantiality:  
the relative size of the religious organization.  Courts seem to be sensitive to the 
hardships faced by small churches subjected to individualized assessments by 
municipal zoning bodies, which may operate with standardless discretion and few, 
if any, procedural safeguards.  Recently, Judge Posner best captured this idea in 
World Outreach Conference Center when he explained that “burden is relative to 
the weakness of the burdened.”195  In that case, Judge Posner seemed taken by the 
fact that the claimant, a small “Christian sect” that ministered to the urban poor, 
confronted what he paints as a large, incompetent, and corrupt bureaucratic 
apparatus.196  The thread runs throughout the opinion and helps explain the court’s 
strong ruling against the city. 
This cognizance of the relative size of the religious organization emerges in 
other key RLUIPA decisions as well.  In Westchester Day School, a small school 
confronted what the Second Circuit depicted as a zoning board prone to 
“miscalculation” and to making decisions “without a basis in fact,” “unsupported 
by [the board’s] own experts.”197  The court sketches a bumbling bureaucracy 
 
 189. Id. at 983. 
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 192. Id. at 983–84. 
 193. Id. at 989. 
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 195. World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 196. Id. at 535–37.  
 197. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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interfering with a school’s expansion in arbitrary ways.  Again, in Greek Orthodox 
Church, the Seventh Circuit found substantiality because it seemed certain that the 
church, were it to continue to file additional permit applications with the city, 
would only encounter “delay, uncertainty, and expense.”198  In Trinity Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. City of Peoria, the companion case to World Outreach 
Conference Center, Judge Posner was far less sympathetic to the claimant, “a 
substantial religious organization,” when it sought what he saw as an exemption to 
a historic preservation designation.199  Judge Posner, in that case, articulated a 
principle that judges would be wise to follow in future cases:  “whether a given 
burden is substantial depends on its magnitude in relation to the needs and 
resources of the religious organization in question.”200 
B.  THIRD CHURCH 
To see further how these factors might operate in practice, consider the case of 
the Third Church of Christ, Scientist discussed in the Introduction.201  From the 
church’s perspective, Washington, D.C.’s landmark designation burdened its 
religious exercise in four significant ways.  First, it forced the church to “pray in 
and pay for” a structure that the small congregation found unwelcoming and 
unreflective of its spiritual mission.202  The building features a four-hundred-person 
auditorium that, according to the church, creates “a dark, broken-up and unfriendly 
atmosphere.”203  Second, apart from the building’s impact on the church’s 
subjective religious experience, the structure itself is deteriorating.204  According to 
the church, water permeates the concrete walls, which has created multiple 
construction problems, including poor insulation, an inability to control the interior 
temperature, a damp smell and large-scale structural weakening.205  The landmark 
designation forced Third Church to bear the brunt of these costs.  For instance, the 
church has to operate its central heating and cooling system full-time in order to 
keep the building’s interior bearable for visitors.206  Additionally, changing even 
one of the auditorium ceiling’s electric light bulbs requires scaffolding installation 
at a cost of $8,000.207  As the church explained, it wishes to use its funds to further 
its religious mission and “not for the maintenance of a Brutalist building.”208  
Third, the designation prevents the church from razing its building and constructing 
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of the Christian Science Complex, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1992, at G1. 
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a more suitable building on the property.209  And fourth, the designation creates an 
unreasonable economic hardship for the church, which it predicted would likely 
lead to its demise by 2017.210  The landmark designation threatened the church’s 
existence both financially and spiritually. 
Had Third Church not settled with the preservations and continued to litigate in 
court, it would have been unlikely, however, to succeed on a Free Exercise Clause 
claim under City of Hialeah because there is little evidence that Washington, D.C. 
overtly discriminated against it in landmarking the church building.  The church’s 
claim that the city violated RLUIPA would stand a greater chance of success, but a 
court would have to determine whether the city’s actions imposed a substantial 
burden on the church’s religious exercise.  The D.C. Circuit has not adopted an 
interpretation of the substantial burden provision, but supposing it chose to apply 
the Seventh Circuit’s formulation, the court would ask whether the landmark 
designation “bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering 
[the church’s] religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable.”211  This inquiry 
focuses the court’s attention on how Third Church experiences the landmark 
designation in the context of its religious exercise.  The city might argue that the 
church had been functioning adequately for decades and that the designation had no 
discernible impact on the church’s religious exercise.  Who, however, is ultimately 
to say whether the landmark status rendered Third Church’s free exercise 
“effectively impracticable”?  The court, even if it knew how to answer such a 
question, would be deciding a theological matter—one that falls “outside the 
secular competence” of government officials.212 
The multifactor approach outlined above, though, offers a structured way to 
view the facts of the case and to derive a logical resolution consistent with 
precedent.  First, the court might consider the role of any special interests in the 
city’s decision to preserve the church’s architecture.  The initial application to the 
city’s Historic Preservation Review Board to landmark Third Church was filed by a 
nonprofit land use organization called the Committee of 100 on the Federal City.213  
The private group lodged its landmark application against the church’s will.214  
Even more disconcerting is the fact that the chairman of the Review Board, who 
presided over the hearing on whether to landmark the church building, was a 
member, former trustee and former chair of the Committee of 100, the organization 
pressing for the designation.215  The Review Board chairman did not recuse himself 
or disclose his affiliation with the Committee of 100.216  Moreover, he declined to 
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consider the church’s religious interests217 and informed the church that it could 
“challenge the landmarking in any court of your choice.”218  Despite the church’s 
local neighborhood commission strongly opposing the landmark designation, the 
Review Board rejected each of the commission’s stated concerns.219  Seen in light 
of these facts, the “picture painted by the complaint” begins to come into focus.220 
There is also evidence that the Review Board directed particular attention at 
Third Church because of its status as a religious organization.  That is, the city may 
not have been as interested in preserving a Brutalist building as it was interested in 
preserving a Brutalist church.  The Board viewed the church “within the context of 
local Modernist churches” and described it as “one of [Washington’s] most 
important Modernist churches.”221  The Board also incorporated into its findings an 
architectural review that described Third Church as a “notable contribution to the 
city’s famous ‘street of churches,’” which suggests that the city’s interest in 
preserving Third Church had to do with more than just Brutalist preservation.222  
Especially revealing is the Board’s faint acknowledgement—couched in a 
footnote—that the city contains other Brutalist buildings, including “a firehouse, a 
couple of schools, public housing, [and] the FBI building,” but it deems these 
“largely public buildings” less important and “less successful” than the church 
edifice.223  One Washington Post columnist easily recounted a number of other 
prominent Brutalist buildings in the city:  “[Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority] headquarters, the FBI building, the University of the District of 
Columbia, and the Forrestal and [the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development] government office buildings.”224  This context indicates that the 
Review Board may have been more interested in Third Church qua Brutalist church 
than qua Brutalist building. 
Finally, a court trying to determine whether the city imposed a substantial 
burden on the church might consider the relative size of the religious organization.  
Despite the large size of the church’s auditorium, the small Christian Scientist 
congregation tops out at around sixty Sunday attendees.225  As of 2009, the church 
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had received no bequests in recent years, though its expenses were mounting.226  In 
2007, the church’s income was $225,000 and its expenses were $269,000, 
including $126,000 in building maintenance alone.227  In the ten-year period prior 
to 2007, the church operated with a deficit every year.228  Further, the church has 
no assets to secure a loan other than its deteriorating building.229  The church’s 
resources are minimal, and if substantiality “depends on its magnitude in relation to 
the needs and resources of the religious organization in question,”230 Third Church 
would have a strong likelihood of success in demonstrating that the city imposed a 
substantial burden on its religious exercise. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
There is nothing groundbreaking about the four factors discussed above, yet 
courts shy away from identifying the factors as such.  This list of factors is far from 
exhaustive, but it provides an idea of how courts can tackle difficult RLUIPA cases 
in the future.  One advantage of relying on these factors in assessing substantiality 
is that, as seen above, courts already in fact do so—albeit in backhanded ways.  
Courts rely on the factors without being forthright about it and continue to place 
their faith in vague formulations, which play little role in their actual analyses.  One 
reason for the enduring popularity of the vague formulations might be that they 
serve as an anchor for the rule of law.  Candidly recognizing the role that the 
multifactor approach plays in deciding RLUIPA cases perhaps comes too close to 
an acknowledgment that courts simply look at whether the municipal actors 
manifested bad faith.  As the Second Circuit stated, “The same reasoning that 
precludes a religious organization from demonstrating [a] substantial burden in the 
neutral application of legitimate land use restrictions may, in fact, support a 
substantial burden claim where land use restrictions are imposed on the religious 
institution arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully.”231  That is, a church 
experiencing a detriment may be unable to show a substantial burden when a city 
applies a land use regulation in a neutral and legitimate way, but it might succeed 
on its substantiality claim, even with the same detriment,  if the city is acting 
arbitrarily.232  To return to the point made earlier in this Note, this kind of thinking 
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focuses the court’s attention on the way a city applies its laws and not purely on 
how a church experiences state action.233 
Another reason courts may be hesitant to embrace the multifactor thinking—for 
it is more a way of viewing the problem than an actual test—is that it also comes 
close to reducing RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision to a tool for policing 
religious targeting and discrimination.  This would render the provision a 
redundancy, since it is foremost the Free Exercise Clause itself which protects 
against religious discrimination and targeting.  Any religious targeting would 
constitute a violation of the actual First Amendment.  RLUIPA’s substantial burden 
provision seems more relevant for situations when targeting cannot be proven.  
Yet, as the cases discussed in this Note highlight, there is a vast gray area of 
situations where religious discrimination cannot be overtly proven but where it 
nonetheless occurs.  In these cases there may be insufficient evidence for a church 
to show it was overtly targeted in a way that would establish a First Amendment 
violation under City of Hialeah.  RLUIPA, then, is necessary because of “the 
vulnerability of religious institutions . . . to subtle forms of discrimination.”234  
Judge’s Posner’s characterization is revealing:  “[T]he ‘substantial burden’ 
provision backstops the explicit prohibition of religious discrimination . . . much as 
the disparate-impact theory of employment discrimination backstops the 
prohibition of intentional discrimination.”235  Though the multifactor approach 
illustrates how RLUIPA can serve as an engine to limit religious discrimination, the 
substantial burden provision does work differently from and complimentarily to the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
The multifactor approach provides an analytic framework with which courts can 
decide actual RLUIPA cases.  Evaluating the substantiality of the detriment felt by 
a church—as well as whether a state’s proffered interests are sufficiently 
compelling—will remain “difficult determinations.”236  But until the Supreme 
Court offers a solution, courts will require some means to trudge through the 
morass and make these difficult determinations.  The reliance on vague 
formulations has proven insufficient.  Going forward, courts can apply the 
multifactor perspective in historic preservation and other land-use cases.  It is not 
an ideal solution, but it does offer an alternative way to interpret RLUIPA’s 
“substantial burden” language. 
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